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Abstract
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monopolist's optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically superior innovation. In
this paper we show that, when the price of some competitively supplied input used in the final product market
is endogenous and is altered by adoption of the innovation, then the optimal pricing strategy of the
monopolist may lead to incomplete innovation. Thus, the conclusion of complete adoption of the superior
technology is partly attributable to the partial equilibrium nature of prior models.
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f- Incomplete Adoption^ofa Superior.lniipvatioii , .
We consider a model in whichan innovatingmonopolist ofa technologicallysuperior
• intermediate inputmust sellthis product tofinal outputproducers. Prior researchshows ,
that, with complete information, the monopolist's optimal strategy will lead to complete
adoptionofthis technologically superior innovatiom-In thispaper weshowthat, when .
theprice ofsomecompetitively suppliedinputused in thefinalproduct market is
endogenotis and is altered by. adoption ofthe innovation, thenJhe optimalpricing
strategyof themonopolist may lead to incomplete innovation. Thus, theconclusion of
complete adoption of thesuperiortechnology, ispartly attributable to thepartial
equilibrium nature ofprior models.
.1 I ,1 I,' •; I 1 -• • 1 '' .j " • _ ' ' I
, . . I. j iDtroduction , ' ^
^Since Solow*S '(i956, 1957) original work on growth theory,,it has been apparent that much of the
economic.growth that developed countries have experienced-has been due to "technological innovations."
These innovations may take a variety of forms, including innovations.that result in more efficient ways of
producing existing products (process innovations) or,those thatiresult in new products (producti > . .
innovations). Innovations may occur in,the final.goods market or-in the production of intermediate .
goods. Indeed, much of the recent endogenous growth theory has focused on those.innovations that affect
the provision of intermediate goods. .As the literature on theeconomics of research and development
(R&D) suggests^ however, it is not the mere discovery of new knowledge that leads to economic progress;
to realize private and/or social benefits it,is necessary that innovations be adopted by firms. .An
innovationmay be adopted directly by theidiscoverer or, when it,is protected by intellectual property
rights, the innovation may be.transferred to,other, adopters through licensing agreements... •,, •
. The literature on-technology adoptionihas.emphasizedthe process of "diffusion" (Karshenas and
Stoneman, 1995).„Diffusion refers to the widely observed;phenomenoniwherebymew technologies are.
adopted slowly through time. Heterogeneity, among users, uncertaintyand information considerationsare
among the explanations that havebeenoffered tb'explain .the time.path of adoption. More-recently,
attention has been devoted to the effects that licensing and strategic interactions among agents canhave
on thediffusion of innovations (seeReinganum, 1989, foran excellent review). Difftision, of course, can
explain why a superior innovation is not adopted immediately, and why new and obsolete technologies
may coexist at any given point in time. But in most models of diffusion the premise is that, eventually,
the adoption of a superior technology will be complete. Whereas we.ignore the dynamic features of
diffusion, our analysis can be interpreted as studying conditions that affect the limit to which the time
path of technological diffusion tends. Specifically, we focus our analysis on "adoption" in a full
information setting in the context of an innovation that is transferred to end-users through licensing.
Most of the literature on the licensing of innovations presumes that the right to the innovation (a
patent, say) is held by a single owner (either an R&D firm or an incumbent firm) and that the license will
be offered to a limited number of firms in an imperfectly competitive industry (e.g., Katz and Shapiro,
1986; Kamien and Tauman, 1986), Issues that arise in this context include the number of firms that
should be licensed and the nature of the optimal license. A common and important feature of such
models of technology adoption through licensing is that, in the presence ofperfect information and
Bertrand price competition, the adoption of a superior innovation will be complete. For example, suppose
the innovation entails an improved production method that, at given input prices, lowers the costs of
producing a given output for those firms that acquire the license. Then, if Bertrand competition prevails,
only the more efficient firms (those that purchase the license) will actually produce output so that the
adoption of the innovation is complete (though the presence of the other firms without access to the
innovation typically affects the pricing strategy of innovating firms).'
In this paper we consider the issue of adoption of product innovations in intermediate goods in a
model that relaxes an ubiquitous assumption of existing innovation adoption models, namely that the
prices of all inputs (other than the innovated one) are exogenously given. The particular model that we
develop considers firms which innovate in the intermediate product market but cannot directly use these
inputs to produce final products. Furthermore, we assume that the final users of the innovated
intermediate goods are competitive producers, and that the competitive structure of the final product
' Naturally, if the firms engage in Coumot competition, then those firms which donotacquire the more
efficient technology will (in general) still produce, so that for this case the adoption neednot be complete.
market will not be affected by the imiovation.:Thus, we.assume the innovating fi^ does not have the ,
option ofexploiting the innovation directly but must licensejt, and, licensing to asingle end-user is not a
viable option: Areal world example for which these assumptions are appealing is offered by the U.S. .
agricultural sector,'where an increasing number ofinnovations are produced by asmall set offirms (in the
increasingly integrated seed and chemical industry) and, are adopted by numerous competitive end-users
(the fanners). Farmers lack the resources, knowledge and motivation to carry out the research required to
generate new innovations. -Indeed, one rationale for .the importance 9fpublic research in this area was
precisely the inability orunwillingness ofindividual producers to carry out research (Huffman and
Evenson, 1993). Atpresent, however, private input suppliers (a fairly concentrated sector) are providing
the larger portion of innovations to the,agricultural sector, and thisrole is becoming increasingly
important with the dawn ofbiotechnology (Fuglie et al'., 1996).- Furthermore, because innovations are ,
often embodied in readily soldj and resold, products (such as seeds, fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides), it
isdifficult to imagine a pricing scheme that involves licensing plus revenue.sharing; rather, the new input
is made available to all end-users at the same price (as resale of the product would be difficult to.
preclude). t '
The specialized assumptionsofour model, in a sense, radically simplify the analysis of the
strategic interaction between innovators, and between innovators and adopters, and allowus to focus on a
hitherto neglected aspect of innovation adoption. Specifically, we address the question of how the
innovator's optimal pricing policy is affected when the adoption of the innovation may change the price
of some other input used by final producers. Whereas it is routinely assumed that adoption of new
technologieswill affect the price ofoutput, it is also equally plausible that innovation adoptionwill affect
' the equilibrium prices of some other inputs., innovations that alter the way goods are produced (process
innovations) will change not oniy<production costs, but also the relative demands for inputs, and thus
have the potential to change their equilibrium prices. For example, discussion on the rising inequality in
U.S. relative wages of.skilled and unskilled labor has long centered on.the effects of skilj-biased
technological progress (Bound and Johnson, 1992). Recent agricultural biotechnology innovations such
as Roundup Ready soyabeans and Bt maize, which are experiencing breathtaking adoption rates in the •
United States, are also having dramatic effects on the composition of farmers' demand for herbicides and
pesticides. Furthermore, because yield increase is a significant attribute of these innovations, the change
in profitability of these transgenic crops affects demand for land and hence its price. These agricultural
biotechnology innovations also fit our licensing framework because they are patented and marketed as
proprietary innovations.^
Previous models concerning pricing and adoption of an innovation have held other input prices
constant (by assuming constant marginal cost). But, as we have argued, adoption ofnew technologies is
likely to affect the equilibrium prices of some inputs. Because the economic viability of the innovations,
in turn, depends on these input prices, an innovator pricing a proprietary discovery will rationally take
that into account. Recognizing the endogeneity of input prices, in effect, transforms this standard partial
equilibrium model of adoption of innovations into a general equilibrium model in which the producer of
the innovated input recognizes the impact of his actions on other input prices. In this setting the main
contribution of this article is to show that, due to the endogeneity of input prices, it may be optimal for the
innovating firm to price its product so that the adoption of a strictly superior technologymay not be
complete.
I. The Model -
Whereas the model we develop is applicable for an innovation in any industry which utilizes a
specific factor, for concreteness our modeling will rely on the agricultural sector example discussed in the
introduction whereby land denotes the input whose price is endogenously determined. Specifically, we
consider an industry that is composed of a large number of competitive producers. Because of their small
size, these producers do not engage in research activities aimed at improving the production technology.
^For example, Monsanto ismarketing seeds ofRoundup Ready soyabeans inthe United States by
charging an explicit "technology fee" for this herbicide-resistant crop. In 1999 this technology fee"
amounted to $ 6.50 per lbs 50 bag, which constitutes a markup of more than 40 percent over otherwise
comparable traditional soyabean varieties (Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky, 1999).
Instead, the relevant R&D is performed by larger firms that supply inputs to this competitive industry.
The innovations areembodied'.in new and improved inputs (s.g., seeds, herbicides, pesticides, fertilizers,
machine '^) etc.) that can substi^te for existing inputs. Further, it is assumed that innovating firms cannot
exploit,their innovation by engaging directly in,production ofthe final good. Thus, to benefit from their
innovations, the firms performing this R&D must transfer the new technology to the competitive
producers, i.e., they need to "license" their innovation toa competitive sector.
The problem of technology diffusion through licensing has been considered in many studies. In
most models, however, licensing entails the transfer of new technology between firms that are all engaged
in final production in an oligopolistic setting (Gallini and Winters, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985), such
that, for example, the innovating firm retains the option not to license (which we have ruled out).
Alternatively, in a setting that is closer to the.economic environment that we are modeling, when it. is
assumedthat R&D is carried out by a research lab not engaged in production but licensing to downstream
firms (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1986), the possibility of licensing only to a few
firms (or only one firm) is still available, so that the strategic interaction between licensees is crucial^
For example, in the model of Kamien and Tauman (1986), an innovator that can potentially license to a
competitive industry would still optimally choose to licenseonly one firm when the innovation is drastic.
In our model, on the other hand, because of reasons discussed earlier, we assume pure competition for the
downstream adopting firms, and we assume that this structure is not affected by the introduction of
innovations.
Because we are explicitly concerned with innovations that are necessarily embodied in inputs that
can easily be resold by purchasers, we also assume that the price of the improved input is the instrument
^ Anumber of related questions have been addressed in this context, including: the incentive to share
innovations through licensing (Gallini and Winters, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985); the effects that the
possibility of licensing (and imitation) has on the incentives to innovate (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986,
and 1987); and the form of the optimal licensing contract (Kamien and Tauman,^1986; Katz and Shapiro,
1986; Gallini and Wright, 1990). ,
by which the innovating firm extracts a "license fee" for its innovation. More specifically, we consider a
situationinwhich a large number of identicalcompetitive agents produce a final output, denoted by^,
bymeans of an inputvector (x, z,y) where x denotes the inputthat is innovated (e.g., seeds), z denotes
the inputwhose price is endogenousto the industry(e.g., land), and y denotes the vector of all other
inputs. Let Xq represent the old x-input, and Xj denote the new(improved) jur-input. Then final
producers canchoose between an 'old' technology, represented bythe strictly quasi-concave production
function q = F^(XQ,z,y), and a 'new' technology, represented by the strictly quasi-concave production
function q = (x,, z, y)
Now let Wq represent the priceof jCq , Wj represent the price of Xj, r represent the priceof z,
and Vrepresent the price vector of>». Then dual to F'^ (xQ,z,3^)and i '^(A:,,z,>')there exist cost
functions C°(^,H'o,r,v) and C^(^,>i',,r,v), respectively. We will assume that the two technologies
exhibit constant returns to scale (at least at the industry level) with respect to all inputs^ Furthermore,
because the prices of the input vector y are assumed to be exogenously given and play no relevant role in
the analysis that follows, for notational clarity we will subsume the (constant) vectorv in the cost
functional. Hence, the cost functions corresponding to the (linearly homogeneous) old and new




^This representation of innovation isnot particularly restrictive aswe could consider thenew technology
as havingone more input than the old technology. Themain point here is that the decision is not simply
whetherto adopt the new technology, but also howmuch to use of the input which embodies that
technology.
^Without much change in analysis, wecould allow firms to have U-shaped costcurves, but assume free
entry of firms. However, because thez-input is specific to the industry in question, the endogeneity of its
price (detailedbelow) still entails a positivelysloped industrysupply curve.
Thus, for given prices Wq ,Wj ,'and r, and (w, ,r) represent the unit cost ofproducing the
final outputwith the old and new technology, respectively.
To simplify our analysis somewhat, we assume that the old input arid the new input are
both produced with a constant unit cost c Thus, we are explicitly modeling innovations that take the
form of new and improved versions ofagiven input (apesticide with amore effective active ingredient,
anherbicide with a broader spectrum ofcontrol, a fertilizer thatis better absorbed bya given plant, a
more productive seed variety, a more powerful tractor, etc.). When old and new inputs are measured in
the same units, their physical productions costs (that is,excluding thecosts ofR&D) areassumed to be
the same. Among other things, we can then define the new technology as superior if:'
(3) F'{x,z,y)> F°{x,z,y) V {x,z,y)
In terms of the dual costs this notion of a superior technology implies that:
(4), , . , . .
Thus, for example, if the new inputwere soldat the same price as the old input, per unit production costs
would fall (hence, productivity increases).^ ^ ,
n. Innovation Adoption with Exogenous Input Prices
To characterize the impact of the innovation, an importantcondition is whether or not the
innovation is "drastic" (Arrow, 1962). In our setting a drastic innovation is one in which the innovator's
®This assumption'is riot crucial, but merely simplifies the" following analys'is. The crucial assumption is
that if both inputs are marginal cost priced, production costs with the new technology are lower.
' Actually, forthenew technology to bevaluable, it need not beglobally superior, merely superior at the
original set of factor prices (input vector). Allowing convex combinations of each,technology to,be used,
then expost the new isoquant must lie below the old one.
®Ingeneral, because the innovation creates a new jr-input, the notion of a superior technology should be
defined with respect to the (social) unit cost of producing the new input. Hence, the advantage of the
simplifying assumption adopted —the production cost for the new input is the same as that of the old
input it replaces. . , >, < , >• . •
pricing decisions arenotconstrained by the threat ofcompetition from thepre-existing technology; hence,
the innovator can act as an unconstrained monopolist. When the.innovation is not drastic, on the other
hand, the innovator's pricing is constrained by the threat of competition, although, as is readily apparent,
the innovator will always be able to choose a price such that she makes a positive profit (exclusive of
R&D costs). Regardless ofwhether the innovation is drastic or not, however, for the standard case in
which all other input prices are constant, the end result will be that the superior technology is adopted and
totally replaces the pre-existing technology.
The assumption of the exogeneity of factor prices is difficult to defend in a general equilibrium,
or "multi-market", model in which the industry affected by the innovation is a major employer of some
"specific" factor. As we argued at the outset, for example, in the case of agriculture it is clear that the
price of some factors, particularly land, have been significantly affected by technological innovation.
Thus, in what follows we investigate the adoption of innovations when some factor prices are
endogenous. Before doing that, to fix ideas, it is useful to consider the benchmark case in which all other
input prices are not affected by the introduction of an innovated input.
Supposethat the price vector (r,v) is exogenously given and constant (i.e., input t is produced
underconstantunit costs), and also assume that the original input (Xq) is produced by a competitive
industry atconstant unit cost c (hence Wq=c ).^ Then we expect full adoption ofthe new technology
for this case, regardless ofwhether the innovation is "drastic" or "non-drastic". To illustrate, consider
first the pricingof the innovation by the producerof a:, if there were no alternative production technique,
i.e., the unconstrained monopoly solution. By Shephard's lemma, the demand for the_input sold by the
monopolist is g • . But what matters for the monopolist is the derived demand,which accounts
for equilibrium in the output market. If p represents the final good price, and D{p) is the final good
' As isapparent, the results forthiscase are the same asone in which theoriginal producer of the input
is alsoa monopolist, provided the firms engage in (Bertrand) price competition.
demand,:then under the assumption ofconstant returns toscale and competition in the final good sector,
in equilibrium the output price will,equal the unit production .cost under thanpw.technology, that is:
(5) p = 4\wj,r)
Hence, under the assumption that no alternative technology ,exists,'the derived demand for facing the,^
«• I ^ "
innovator monopolist is:
« I ' . ' ' I ^ J' .
Maximizingprofit for the innovator leads to the solution :
(7) w"=argmax{(w,, . . - ,
Given that the old technology is in fact available, however, the unconstrained price may not
' , ' ;• . .M. 'i , • 'I ' •
be feasible because, at that price,producers of the final outputmaychoosenot to adopt the innovation.
Specifically, defineWj as the price of the innovated inputthatmakes final producers indifferent between
thenew and 9ld technology; i.e., w, solves = When prices {r,v) are constant, then
for w, > iVi the constrained demand for is zero, so-that w,- acts as,an upper bound on,the price.the
monopoiistcan charge. Now, if <W, , then the'threat of competitiohYroni'the alteriiative technology
is irrelevant, and the innovation is "drastic." On the other hand, if , then the innovation is
"non-drastic" and the price constraint binds; however, as long as vvj > c, as must be the case under the
assumption that the new technology is superior, then the monopolist will charge Wj and the innovation
will be fully adopted byall firms.'® Thus, we obtain the well known result that, when the innovation is
technologically superior, and all input prices are constant, then the innovator will price the new input to
capture the whole market, i.e., adoption of the superior technology is complete. This result is hardly
• • ' " L' •• '-n 1 n/ . c / i mI •
Strictly speaking, firms are indifferent between using the old and new technology at thiis price,
Following standard convention, however, we assume that all firms adopt the new technology in that case
(becausethe innovator could price Xy a "little" below vP, in order to capture the whole market).
surprising, and it is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, the innovator-monopolist is,maximizing profit given by
,where'xf(Wi) isthe effective derived demand, which isdefined as:
if W, <iv,
(8) x/'Civ,) = 0,x^(w,) if w, =w,€
0 if ^\>
In the next section we extend the model to consider the more realistic situation in which some of the input
prices are affected by the adoption of the innovation.
TTf. Innovation Adoption with Endogenous Input Prices
Inmany circumstances it isreasonable to assume that, due to a rising input supply curve for some
factor, the equilibrium competitive price ofthat input isaffected by the technology used in an industry
and by the prices ofother inputs. In such a case, even though firms inthe final product market have
constant returns to scale technology, the industry isnot a constant cost industry, and the reasoning of the
preceding section does not apply. Hence, the conclusion that complete adoption will be attained for a
non-drastic innovation may not apply either. Forthespecific example of agricultural production
considered earlier, it is land prices (rents, actually) thatare affected by innovations in agricultural
productivity, but obviously our analysis generalizes to other sectors in which one ormore input prices are
t
determined endogenously. Here, for simplicity we restrict attention to the case in which only one price,
that is r (the price of z), is endogenous.
Given the endogeneity of r there is not, in general, a single threshold price wj such thatthe new
input captures the whole market if w, < but demand for :x, falls to zero if Wi > . Thus, itwill not
generally be the case that the demand for x, is infinitely elastic atany point, as was true in the previous
section with exogenous input prices. The reason for this can be understood as follows. Let|/7 ,r
denote the pre-innovation competitive equilibrium prices ofoutput and input z, respectively (when only
10
the original technolo^ is used^d input is^pricedW its m^girialicost c). Now let denote'thel
price ofthe new input such that, at the given price ofthe 2 input, . Hence, if
J . • •5'. ^ .j • • ' 'i'- ' I ' .« . I .
the new innovation is priced at any higher price (w, > , competitive producers will not find it
desirable to adopt thenew innovation and demand for jjri'will be.zeroiiwhereas at firms are -
indifferent as towhich technblo^ to use. If theprice of z were unaffected bythe adoption of the new • -
technology, then as use of thenew technology expanded firms would remain indifferent as,to which -
technique were used, anddemand for Xj 'wouldbeinfinitely elastic until adoption was complete;
However, if adoption of the newtechnology alters demand for input z andthei supply of this input is not •
perfectly elastic, price /*^-'will change ais adoption expahdsj hieaning that'firms are no longer willing to •
utilizeboth techniques unlessthe priceof the new inputalsochanges to maintain the equivalence of
private costs on the two techniques. Hence, demand for the new input will not be perfectly elastic.
An alternative way of illustrating this point is to suppose that the monopoly firm produces a given
amount of the new input and allows its price to be determined endogenously. As above,'if the
• " !f - •..! {Tl , .. /.;• 'H • ' • v.. • : • ' I- I , • .
PCamount supplied is zerothe corresponding demand pricemustbe at least Vfj , whereasfor small (but
' r I ' . ' f 'j;L' v. .iij'iI' . > ' _. ' ! ' • . . 'j •. - , '
positive) supply of the demand price will be in the neighborhood of . Furthermore, it is apparent
' c .Iff!-- • J. ; I ' .-'I- '
that if the amount of x, supplied is ''low" both techniques must be used to satisfy final demand and the
price w, has to be determined such that production costs for the final output are the same wi^ either
technique. As the monopolist increases the amount of x^ sold, at given prices the expanded use of the
new technique and contraction of the old will, in general, change demands for all factors if these
techniques have different input requirements. If all other input prices are fixed, then no change in is
required to absorb the additional new input: all that happens is use of the new technique expands, use of
the old contracts, and total output and all prices remain the same (until the innovation is completely
" In such a setting itdoes not matter whether .the monopolist isa price setter orquantity setter.'
11
adopted). But if the supply ofsome ofthese factors is less than perfectly elastic, then the corresponding
prices must adjust as adoption ofthe new technology expands. Thus, in our case, the price ofz will
change asuse of x^ increases. However, as r changes, the value of "Wj required tomake production
costs on the new and old techniques the same must also change.'^ Thus, even when the old and new
techniques coexist, the demand for the new input willnot be perfectly elastic. This raises the possibility
that itwill beoptimal for themonopolist to price thenew input so that the adoption of the superior -
technique is not complete.
Tocharacterize equilibrium when oldand new technologies maycoexist, letS{r) denote the
(upward sloping) supplyof the z inputto the industry, andconsider first the pre-innovation equilibrium.




Equation (9) states that final product price equals marginal cost, equation (10) states that final product
supply equals demand, and equation (11) specifies equilibrium in the z input market.
Now consider the effects of an innovation, and suppose at first that only the new technique can be





These adjustments must occur if the input perunit output requirements differ on the twotechniques.
12
Solving (12>(14) simultaneously yields77^(wj) and which represent the equilibrium prices
for output and input z conditional on the price ofthe innovated input. Given that by Shephard's lemma
input demand is in this pure monopoly case the derived demand for the innovated
input X] is:
(15)
This derived deniahd locus is sketched inFigure 2.Under the assumptioii of no competition from the old
technology, theunconstrained monopoly solution, denoted by• would be found by
maximizing profit (w, - c)x,^(w,).
1 ' : ' •, . • I . .-Ill ' •
Because in fact the innovator-monopolist must face potential competition from the old
technology, the derived demand function isonly relevant in the domain where unit production
costwiththe old technology is largerthan unit production costwith the newtechnology, that is for allWj
I
such that If it happensthat the unconstrainedmonopoly solution
is such that where is the price of runderthe
unconstrained monopoly solution, then the innovation is "drastic" and it is completely adopted. In such a
situation the presence of the alternative production technique does not constrain the monopolist's pricing
behavior; However, if , then'the innovation is "non-drastic" and the monopolist's
pricing (sales) decision is constrained by the presence of the original technique. To analyze a "non- •
drastic", innovation, we must find the relationship, between w, and x, in the domain where both
techniques coexist.''' .We know that if is "too high" (w, > only the old technique will be used
For a superior innovationwe knowthis domain is not empty because for all r .
Weknowthis domain is non-empty since, for nearzero (w, near w/"") the old techniquewill be used.
Also, the assumption the innovation is non-drastic implies this domain must be nonempty.
13
and the demand for x, will be zero. We also know that ifXy is sufficiently large [e.g., x, > (c), so
that Wj < c ] then only the new technique will be used. Thus, by continuity, there must exist a range of
Xj such that both techniques will be used simultaneously. We show below that, in general, the demand
schedule will not be infmitely elastic in that domain.
To characterize the innovator's derived demandwhen both techniques (may) coexist, let
denote total output produced using the new technique and denote total output produced using the old
technique. Because by Shephard's lemma the demand for the innovated input in this domain is
I
x, = ,r), to obtain the derived input demand curve we need to endogeneize output and the






where equation (18) holds as a strict equality ifql >0 and equation (19) holds asa strict equality if
9i' > 0. The derived demand curve for the innovated input when both techniques (strictly) coexist, say
("^i) ~ (^i)' '^(•^i>'*(^i)) >where (w,) =q^ and r(w,) =r' are part ofthe solution to
equations (16)-( 19) in the domain for which ql>0 and ^,* > 0. Note that the pre-innovation equilibrium
discussed earlier can be obtained as a special case of equations (16)-(19) [for = 0 and p =
the unconstrained monopoly demand, also discussed earlier, is another special case of equations (16)-(19)
[for ^0 = 0 and
14
To daborate further on the nature of this demandcurve, recall that (Wj) intersects the vertical
axis at . As the monopolist expands (frorn zero) the amount of x, for sale, for given input (and
henceoutput) prices, total output (demand)will be unchanged, but must increase (and hence q^
decrease by the same amount) to absorb the additional . 'If the supply of land is less than infinitely • i. '
elastic,-and the new technology uses land in a,different proportion than the old technology, the
equilibrium input price r will have to change, which in turns affects the price of the innovated input.
For example, suppose that the amount of land used per unit output is higher for the old technology than
for the new technology [that is, evaluated at Given all input
prices, and hence output price, an expansion in sales of x, requires to increase (and q^to decrease,
such that dqQ = -dq^) to absorb theadditional x^. But, given theassumption on factor requirements,
this implies thatthedemand for land falls, and hence r must'decrease to restore equilibrium in the land
market. Furthermore, the decrease in land prices reducescosts on both technologies, but reduces them by
' • .'I ' ' f ' _I ' I ,1 • I , . • , ,
more on the old technology, which is land intensive; hence w, mustdecrease to maintain the
competitiveness of the new technology.'^
Theforegoing conclusion about the slope of thederived demand for the innovated input admits
one exception. Specifically, even when thesupply of land isnot perfectly elastic, if thetwo techniques
use land in the same proportion [i.e., = (l>l{c,r) whenever then we can
see from (16) that the demand for land, and hence the price of land, will be unaffected bythe increased
availability ofXj (giyen dq^ =—dq^^. In such acase, neither output price nor Wj need adjust toabsorb
the additional x, and the deriyed demand cuwe/or the innovated input would beinfinitely elastic, until it
intersects the unconstrained monopoly demand curve [at j].
Note that the conclusion would be .the same ifthe new. technology were land intensive, except landand
output prices would increase as sales ofx, expanded; however, w, would still decre^e to offset the
impact ofhigher land prices on the more land-intensive new technology.
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.Barring the (implausible) case ofthe two techniques having identical input requirements, it
follows that if the supply of land isnot infinitely elastic the derived demand forXj will be strictly
downward sloping in the domain where the two techniques coexist [see the curve xf(wi) in Figure 2].
Furthermore, because as shown in the Appendix the demand curve (w,) is more elastic than
when thecurves intersect, theymust intersect at a single point, say where w{ solves
= and Jc, =x^(w,). For all <w^ (i.e., x, > ) the monopolist'
captures the whole market, and faces the downward-sloping demand curve x^(wi). But for all
e[0,Xi], then >Wi >Wj and the monopolist faces the downward sloping demand curve
This derived demand schedule is shown by the solid curve in Figure 2. Depending on the
elasticity ofderived demand in this domain, it is therefore quite possible that the monopolist may find it
optimal to price itsproduct such thatold and new technologies coexist.
To illustrate explicitly theconditions under which old and new technology will coexist, let us
consider the elasticity of the derived demand for the unconstrained monopoly solution, that is
x:(w,) =(<91ogx" (W])/^log w,). From equations (12)-(14) we find;'^





where =(f,, +7/5^<0, + Ay ={0-s^^-T]S^)>0,
Tj =[<^\ogD{p)/^\ogp) <0 is the elasticity of final demand for output, 0=[^\ogS{r)/^\ogr) >0
denotes the elasticity of supply for the z input, €.^ ={^\og (f>\ (Wj, r)/f?log r) <0 denotes the own-
• A pQ
Ifthe demand for Xj is infinitely elastic in the domain where both techniques are used, then Wj = Wj
Details on the derivation ofK and of are provided in aReader's Appendix that isavailable from
the authors upon request.-'-
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price elasticity of the!coriditiohal demand for inputs, S;^ = denotes the
own-price elasticity of the conditional demand for input x, denotes the
cross-price elasticity of ^e conditional demand for input z, and and s. =r^\l^ denote
the cost shares for inputsx and 2, respectively.
T^e elasticity of the derived demand for the improved input when the two techniques coexist,'
1 • • , • ' ' • / I* I > - - •
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r]sXujTl)-{e,r-el) <0
where S= ^i/(^o+^i) denotes the share of total final output produced with the new technology,
={d\og^l{c,r)^l.d\ogr denotes the ownrprice elasticity of conditional demand for input zusing
the old technique; and u = denotes the relative z intensity of the old and new techniques (thus,
w> 1 implies that, at the given factor prices^ the old techniique uses'more of the z-input per unit output
than does the new^technology, wh'erea'S'the opposite holds when w< 1).
Several things are noteworthy about the expression in (21). First, note that as^ —> 1 the price
elasticity of demand Js strictly larger (in absolute .value) when the two techniques coexist than when there
















where the inequality follows because A-^ > 0,. 'This resultcan be explained as follows. In the
unconstrained monopoly case, the derived demand for JCj responds to increases in its price because: (i)
firms may substitute, other inputs for.;c,; (ii) the higher input prices increase output price, reduce final
. " •• *-c'"' • •'I" •' i .i! I • [-
<1^
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output and thus reduce demand for ; and finally because (iii) theprice of land changes as w, increases.
In the casewhere both techniquesare used, all these factorsare at work plus, as w, increases, firms will
substituteaway from the new technique back to the old technique(i.e., for a given output level, will
decrease and increase). This latter effect implies that demand must be more elastic when the two
techniques coexist. More importantly, note that the elasticity ofdemand forxf (Wj) is finite in this
domain, with two main exceptions: when (i) the supply ofz is infinitely elastic, so that r is exogenous
-¥oo as ^ ^ 00 ); or(ii) the unit input requirement for z is the same with both techniques (w = l).
Case (i) represents the standardpartial equilibrium model where all factor prices are treated as exogenous,
and thus there is a unique price for the superior input that allows both technologies to coexist. Case (ii)
ariseswhen M=1 [suchthat ^\w^,r)= => <j)\{wy,r) = ipl[c,r)]. This means that, although
factor prices are endogenous, given that production costs must be the same for the two techniques when
they coexist, changes in the composition ofoutput do not affect factor demands/^ Clearly, case (ii) is
very unlikely to hold for arbitrary changes in technology. The one situation where it will hold is when the
new technology is equivalent to the old technology with a pure "input-A:-only" augmenting innovation,
that is F\x^,z,y) =F®(cccj,z,>') with a >1,which implies ,r).
To summarize, when the price of one of the inputs is endogenous to the industry adopting the




0 if < w,
Hence, based on the foregoing we can state the main result of the paper.
The intuition for this special casemay be strengthened byconsidering the analogous resultof the
standardtwo sector - two factor general equilibrium model used in trade theory (the Heckscher-Ohlin
model). In thatmodel, if factor intensities are the same in the two sectors, output supplies (and hence
factor demands) are infinitely elastic; if factor intensities differ inournotation) the general
equilibrium supply curves are positively sloped (the factor demand curves negatively sloped).
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PROPOSITION 1. Suppose inputpricesare suchthat both techniques coexist; then the r. i,
derived demandfor the new inputwill not be infinitely elastic unless: (i) either the supply
of all other inputs is infinitely elastic, or (ii) the unit input requirements are the same for
both techniques. Thus, fora non-drastic iririovatibn, it is possible thatthe irihovat6r*s
optimal price for the new input is such that-acldp'tion'of the innovation is-not complete.'^
' l-j: i r< I rl' • i', . . . . 1I'
' 'K .ij f) ' p. ' .'-Z , if , ' • M I • • • , .tt , , •
Thederived demand Xj (>Vj) is illustrated inFigure 2. Because the innovator-monopolist
j -ii •' 'r. .(i'l ' -I ("'.n!- • •> , y.- ' • :..
maximizes profit given by s (w, - c)xf^ (Wj), it is possible for the optimal solution to be in the
interior ofthe domain where the relevant derived input demand is xf(Wj)in which case the ^o
techniques will coexist. Morespecifically, we haye: ^ ^i
(24) =<(w.)












Hence, the case of a drastic innovation occurs if;
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for Wi < w,
-for' w, >Wi •
- . [ ,
'•jl'1,
implying that the innovator can charge her unconstrained monopoly price. Alternatively, a non-drastic,
/: I .. a' I




Thus, for example, ifthe (unconstrained)^mono'pbiy derived demand is inelastic, but as in the standard
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then the innovation always will be
MTr. i);:/., , ]. .n. .. . ( • j
non-drastic, but complete. Finally, it will be optimalfor the monopolistto price the input so that adoption
is incomplete if: '
(28)
The fact that the adoption is not complete means that an additional source of inefficiency arises
from the monopolypricing of the new input (technology). Traditionally, inefficiencydue to monopoly
pricing of the innovated input arises because: (i) the high price of the input means that input utilization
on the superior technology is not efficient (i.e., the rate of technical substitution among inputs does not
reflect the marginal cost of production of the inputs); and (ii) the higher price of output (due to the
distorted input price) leads to too little provision of output. Here we have shown that, when the prices of
some inputs used by adopters are endogenous, there may be a third source of inefficiency - pure
production inefficiency because an inferior technique is used when a superior technique is available (so
that with the same input levels more output could be produced if only the new technology were used).
For example, with Leontief technology = O) and completely inelastic demand for output
(7=0),any innovation must be non-drastic. Furthermore, ifother input prices were exogenous, then the
innovation would be completely adopted and there would, in fact, be no inefficiency from the monopoly
situation (of course, the input price would be "too high," but that would mean only a pure transfer
payment between consumers and the input supplier). However, if the price of the z -input is endogenous,
then it is possible that the monopolist will price the new input such that both techniques coexist, leading
to inefficient production.
IV. Bertrand Competition and Incomplete Adoption
If the newtechnology can be protectedby intellectual property rights, it is reasonable to assume
the old one is patentable also. Thus, in this section we relaxthe assumption that the pre-innovation
technology is competitively provided. Assuming the pre-innovation technology (asembodied inx^)was
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owned and soldby a single firm, rather,than bycompetitive suppliers, infroduces.a newstrategic
dimension to ouranalysis. •In particular we.now.haye a,duopoly in the provision of thex input to the
competitive end-use sector. As iswellknown theequilibrium outcome of sucha duopoly (including the
implications for adoption of the new input) dependscrucially,on the type ofgame played by incumbent
. ' I ' 1 •; 1 I. • i
and innovatorfirms. If the two firms supplyingthe x input compete in a Coumot (quantity setting)
fashion, then it is apparent that equilibrium may entail both firms selling positive quantities of the input,
regardlessofwhether or not other input prices are constant.- Such'ari instance of incomplete adoption of •
the superior innovation, while interesting and potentially empirically relevant, is certainly implicit in
many of the existing studies on the economics ofR&D. Similarly, 'it is apparent that if incumbent and
innovator firms engage in Bertrand (price setting)'competition'then, given constant prices .of all other
inputs, the equilibrium outcome must be characterized by the complete adoption of the superior
innovation.. But we will show below that, when ithe price of some other input is endogenous to the
industry adopting the innovation, under Bertrand competition it is quite possible that adoption of the
superior innovation is not complete. Hence, the result derivedearlier under competitive productionof the
old X input does generalize to a much richer set of admissible strategic interactions.
To analyzethe Bertrand'competition case, let-Wj, denote the price at which the input is sold;
in theprevious section we assumed Wq=c , whereas when a.duopolist supplies the old input the
restriction is Wg > c . Nowconsiderthe case inwhich r is exogenous. Because in this situation the two
inputs areessentially perfect substitutes, we can show only the new technology will be used. To doso,
define the threshold pricesuch that Fwany <t^{wQ;r) the
innovator captures the whole market, whereas for any iv, >/'(wq;/*) the innovator makes'no sales. Thus,
the demand for x^ is infinitely dastic at /'(wq;/-) . Similarly, define such that
^ ("'ii• By the same argument, ifWq < , the incumbent firm captures the
entire market, while ifWq > ) it makes no sales. Given that the firms engage in price
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competition, aridgiven that the demands are infinitely elastic when both firms have positive sales, the
only possible equilibrium is one in which the innovator captures the whole market. Otherwise, for a set of
prices (>Vj',>Vo) such that both firms make positive sales (with Wq >c), either firm can increase its profits
by lowering its price slightly, thereby capturing the whole market. Thus, the possibilities are: (i) the
innovating firm charges its unconstrained monopoly price if ; or, (ii) the
innovating firm captures the whole market by charging if r'(c;r)<wj^. Thus, when r is
exogenous and the firms engage in Bertrand price competition, the equilibrium is the same as when the
incumbent input producers are competitive.
Next, consider the case when r is endogenous. Under this structure, the derived demand for each
firm's input is determined, as before, by Shephard's lemma in conjunction with the equilibrium
conditions (16)-(19) [but with Wq replacing c in the unit cost function The solution to this
system ofequations determines the functions r(>VpWo), ^1(^1,^0)' Thus,
the derived demands for the new and old inputs are
respectively. The profit functions for the two firms are:
(29) ;r*(wi, w^) = (w, -c)x,^(w,, w^)
(30) (Wo ,w^) ={wq- c)x"(Wq ,Wj)
Clearly, because Wq > c the innovatorcan capture thewhole market by charging w, < Vv, (where iv, is
as defined earlier). Thus, the condition both for a drastic innovation, and a non-drastic innovation that is














then the innovation is non-drastic but complete (because if the incumbent firm charges Wq ~ c, the new
firm's best response is , and if the newfirm charges liVj, the old firm cannotmake any positivesalesat




thenfor Wq=c , the innovating firm's best response is to charge a pricewhichexceeds w,, implying the
I• *1 ..111-., . • ,, . • . ' • • • . ,
incumbent will make some sales (though no profits) at Wq = c. Thus, the incumbent firm has an
incentive to raise price above c, as it can make some sales at a positive profit. The resulting equilibrium
will be one inwhich the two firms both make positive sales and positive profits.^® Thus, we can state the
following result.
PROPOSITION 2. Under the conditions that give rise to incomplete adoption of a
superior innovation when the innovator faces competitive suppliers of the old technology,
incompleteadoption is preserved even if the competitivesuppliers of the old technology
are replaced by a monopolist and the suppliersof new and old technologies engage in
Bertrand competition.
If w, < TV,, any response Wq > c is equally good for theold'incumbent since its sales, andprofits, will
be zero. Thus, -Wpc} would be part of the solution for this Bertrand game. Asolution with'complete
adoption and w^ > isnot possible, asthe incumbent firm would have an incentive to lower price to
capture some sales. . • i ' ; . r .
Define g(wo) to be the solution for w, of /'(wo;/'(vi'p-Wo)) =w,, such that for <g(iV(,) the
innovating firm captures the entire market whereas for Wj > gC^o) the incumbent makes some sales;
thus, the price limit defmed earlier satisfies w, = g(c)Clearly, no Bertrand-equilibrium is possible
v; .
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The remarkablefeatureof this result is that both duopolistsmake positive sales, despite Bertrand
competition and constant marginal production costs for their products. In essence, the endogeneity ofthe
input price r has transformed the outputs ofthe two firms (:Co and ) from perfect substitutes into
imperfect substitutes. Naturally, the actual equilibrium prices, in the case ofincomplete adoption, will
differ between the competitive and Bertrand cases. Inparticular, the old input will be sold at a higher
price in the Bertrand case. Furthermore, assuming the two prices are strategic complements (i.e.,
^7t^I>0),then the innovator will also charge ahigher price than in the competitive case. Thus,
Bertrand competition will lead to higher prices than if the incumbent sector is competitive. However, the
welfare implications are not transparent. Presumably the higher price fortheolder input (which leads to
the higher price for the newer input) means that, in the Bertrand situation, the innovating firm will gain a
larger market share than inthe competitive case, so that this aspect ofproduction inefficiency will be
diminished.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a simple model oftechnology adoption through licensing that
allows for the price ofsome industry-specific inputs to be affected by the adoption ofnew technology.
Specifically, we have studied the equilibrium outcomes when an innovator-monopolist can license its new
technology to competitive end-users while facing the threat ofcompetition from anold technology that is
either competitively supplied orsupplied by an incumbent firm that engages in Bertrand competition.
Themain resultthat is derived is that, in this context, adoption of a superior technology may not be
complete. In other words, the discoverer may find itprofitable to price its innovation such that some
potential adopters will not switch away from the old technology. As the model has illustrated, this • -
with Wo>c and Wj G(wj,g(Wo)), because with Vf, in this domain the incumbent firm can make
positive sales (and positive profits) by charging a price Wq such that c <Wq <Wq.
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somewhat surprising result is due tothe endbgerieity'of-the price ofsome other input that affects the
derived demand for the imiovated input. . •
The fact that innovators exploit the monopoly position granted byintellectual property rights in
general'iihplies some ex-post economic inefficiency,"because the price ofthe innovated input is "too . «"•.
i.'"' . ; J .1 .'I ' T,.
high" (so that not enough ofthis input isused, relative to other inputs) and because "not enough" ofthe
final output isproduced (due to the.distortediprice for the innovated input). Our analysis here has
uncovered a thirdpotential source of ex-post inefficiency in thecontext of technology adoption through
licensing: pure production inefficiency because the superior technique isnotusedifonall the final output
that is produced. Whether the "general equilibrium'? effect thatwe have^studied can explain widespread
instances of incomplete technology adoption in the realworld is an openquestion. But the fact that
technologytransfer through licensing is becoming increasingly relevant for a number ofsectors,'and the
fact, that there are real welfare implications'of incomplete adoption, suggest that more'attention-to the
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Figure 1. DerivedDemandfor'Ihnovated Input..
Given Constant Prices ofOther Inputs. ,
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Figure 2. Derived Demand for Innovated Input
with Endogenous Prices ofOther Inputs
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